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In the United States, the rate of price inflation falls in recessions.  Turning this observation into a useful
inflation forecasting equation is difficult because of multiple sources of time variation in the inflation
process, including changes in Fed policy and credibility.  We propose a tightly parameterized model
in which the deviation of inflation from a stochastic trend (which we interpret as long-term expected
inflation) reacts stably to a new gap measure, which we call the unemployment recession gap.  The
short-term response of inflation to an increase in this gap is stable, but the long-term response depends
on the resilience, or anchoring, of trend inflation.  Dynamic simulations (given the path of unemployment)
















The past five decades have seen tremendous changes in inflation dynamics in the 
United States.  Some of the changes arguably stem from transformations in the U.S. 
economy.  Energy is a smaller share of expenditures than it was during the oil price 
shocks of the 70s, labor union membership has declined sharply over the past forty years, 
and there has been a shift from production of goods to production of services.  Monetary 
policy too has undergone dramatic transformations:  the stance against inflation has 
become more aggressive, there have been discussions of formal or informal inflation 
targets, and there has been a recognition of the importance of expectations – and of 
expectations management – in determining the path of inflation. 
These changes have created major headaches for inflation forecasters.  Research 
over the past decade has documented considerable instability in inflation forecasting 
models, see for example Cogley and Sargent (2002, 2005), Cogley, Primiceri, and 
Sargent (2010), Levin and Piger (2004), and Stock and Watson (2007); the literature on 
this instability is surveyed in Stock and Watson (2009).  Given this instability, inflation 
forecasters have a dearth of reliable multivariate models for forecasting inflation.  In fact, 
it is exceedingly difficult to improve systematically upon simple univariate forecasting 
models, such as the Atkeson-Ohanian (2001) random walk model (although that model 
seems to have broken down in the 2000s) or the time-varying unobserved components 
model in Stock and Watson (2007). 
Yet this picture of the instability and unreliability of multivariate forecasting 
models conflicts with the broad historical regularity that the major postwar U.S.   2
disinflations have all occurred during or just following recessions.  Figure 1 plots the 
paths of the unemployment rate and the 4-quarter rate of inflation
1 (
4
t  ) in the core 
personal consumption expenditure (PCE) price index over the 8 NBER-dated recessions 
from 1960 to 2010.  Because the 1980Q1 recession was only 6 quarters peak-to-peak, 
Figure 1 combines the 1980Q1 and 1981Q3 recessions into a single episode, so the eight 
recessions and their aftermath are presented as seven recessionary episodes.  The plotted 
series are deviated from their values at the date of the NBER peak.  For example, in the 
recession beginning in 1960Q2, the unemployment rate rose from 5.2% in 1960Q2 to 
7.0% four quarters later (1961Q2), an increase of 1.8 percentage points.  Over those four 
quarters, the 4-quarter rate of core PCE inflation fell from 1.9% to 1.2%, a decline of 0.7 
percentage points; these changes, relative to 1960Q2, are plotted in the first panel of 
Figure 1.  In five of the seven recessionary episodes since 1960, inflation fell through the 
date at which the unemployment rate reached its peak, and then either plateaued or 
continued to fall for at least several more quarters.  The most notable exception is the 
1973Q4 recession, which was accompanied by sharp oil price increases and, as discussed 
below, much higher oil price pass-through to core than is currently observed. 
One way to see the commonality among these episodes is to superimpose the 
panels of Figure 1.  This is done in Figure 2, where the data for each episode have been 
scaled so that the unemployment rate increases by one unit between the NBER peak (time 
                                                 
1 Throughout this paper we compute the four-quarter rate of price inflation as 
4
t   = 
100ln(Pt/Pt–4), where Pt is the quarterly value of the price index.  The one-quarter rate of 
inflation, at an annual rate, is computed as t = 400ln(Pt/Pt–1), so 
4
t   = (t + t–1 + t–2 + 
t–3)/4.  If the original price index is monthly, Pt is the average value of the price index 
for the months in the quarter.   3
0) and the unemployment peak (time 1).
 2  Figure 2 also plots the mean of these scaled 
unemployment and inflation rates, along with one-standard error bands. The 1973Q4 
recession is omitted from Figure 2 – but not from our econometrics – because of the 
atypical sequence of energy price increases through the first six months of the recession.    
Averaged over the six episodes in Figure 2, by the time that the unemployment rate 
peaks, the 4-quarter rate of core PCE inflation has fallen by 0.37 percentage points 
(standard error = 0.13) for each percentage point rise in the unemployment rate.  By the 
time that the episode is 50% beyond the peak unemployment rate (that is, at time scale 
1.5 in Figure 2), the 4-quarter rate of core PCE has fallen by 0.59 percentage points (SE = 
0.23) for each percentage point peak increase in the rate of unemployment. 
Two of the episodes in Figure 2 are of particular interest.  The first is 2001Q1.  
Inflation fell through the first 10 quarters of this episode:  by the second quarter of 2003, 
four-quarter core PCE inflation had fallen to 1.5% and there was increasing concern 
about deflation (e.g. Bernanke [2003]).  In 2004, however, inflation deviated from the 
historical pattern by increasing.  The second episode of interest is the recession that 
began in 2007Q4.  Based on currently available data, the path of core PCE inflation in 
this episode is only slightly above the post-1960 average.  We return to both of these 
episodes below. 
                                                 
2 For example, in the 1960Q2 recession the quarterly unemployment rate rose by 1.8 
percentage points from 1960Q2 to its peak in 1961Q2.  Figure 2 thus plots [u(s) – 
u1960Q2]/1.8, where the time scale s is set so that s = 0 is 1960Q2 and s = 1 is 1961Q2.  
The 4-quarter rate of inflation is plotted in the same way, that is, as [
4(s) – 
4
1960 2 Q  ]/1.8, 
on the same time scale as unemployment.  When unemployment peaked in 1962Q2, four-
quarter core PCE inflation had fallen by 0.7 percentage points, so the value plotted for 
inflation for this episode at s = 1 is -0.7/1.8 = -0.4.   4
Figure 2 captures the essential empirical content of the Phillips curve: inflation 
declines during periods of economic weakness.  On average over these recessionary 
episodes, inflation at first falls slowly, then more rapidly as the unemployment rate 
increases.  At some point after the unemployment rate peaks, the inflation rate stabilizes 
at a lower level.  With only seven episodes, the standard errors are fairly large and 
increase with the time after the NBER peak, so these dynamics are estimated imprecisely. 
The goal of this paper is to reconcile the apparent contradiction between the 
instability of Phillips curve forecasting models (and multivariate inflation forecasting 
models more generally) and the empirical regularity in Figure 2.  We do so by drawing 
upon four sets of evidence.  First, we provide nonparametric and parametric evidence of a 
stable linear relationship between inflation and a new gap measure, which we term a 
recession gap.  The unemployment recession gap is the difference between the current 
unemployment rate and the minimum unemployment rate over the current and previous 
eleven quarters.  This new gap is designed to turn the empirical regularity in Figure 2 into 
a variable that can be used in a regression.  Second, we provide nonparametric evidence 
of nonlinearities in the relation between 4-quarter inflation and traditional unemployment 
and output gap measures; this evidence is consistent with the nonlinear parametric 
specification found by Barnes and Olivei (2003).  Third, we conduct a pseudo out-of-
sample forecasting exercise using the unemployment recession gap along with other 
activity measures, including both parametric and nonparametric forecasts; we find that 
simple linear models using the unemployment recession gap provide episodic 
improvements over univariate forecasts of four-quarter inflation, where the forecasting 
improvements occur during economic downturns.  These episodic improvements are   5
consistent with, but sharper than, those noted in Stock and Watson (2009).  Fourth, we 
conduct a dynamic simulation of inflation using the recession gap model and find a good 
match between the actual and predicted inflation paths, given the unemployment path, 
over the five downturns of Figure 2. 
The econometrics in this paper considers a multivariate forecasting model in 
which a candidate variable, say xt, is used to predict the forecast errors from a univariate 
forecast of inflation over the next four quarters, 
4
4 t   .  The univariate model we adopt is 
the unobserved components model of inflation proposed in Stock and Watson (2007), in 
which the rate of inflation is represented as the sum of a stochastic trend, t, and a 
transitory component, where the volatility of the two components varies over time.  In 
this model, the forecast of future inflation using date t information is the best estimate of 
the trend at date t, t|t, so the forecast error for four-quarter ahead inflation is 
4
4 t   –t|t.  
Cogley, Primiceri, and Sargent (2010) refer to the deviation of inflation from t as the 
inflation gap, and, like them, we focus on the predictability of this gap. Specifically, the 
multivariate forecasting models we consider have the form, 
 
4
4 t    = t|t + 4xt + 
4
4 t e  ,          ( 1 )  
 
where 4 is an unknown coefficient and 
4
4 t e   is an error term, and where the 
subscript/superscript “4” indicates that (1) applies to the 4-quarter inflation rate. 
Our primary focus is on the unemployment recession gap as the predictor variable 
xt in (1).  However, we also estimate (1) using other predictors xt, in particular other 
measures of economic activity, survey expectations of inflation, and measures of the   6
money supply.  The findings using other activity variables are consistent with those using 
the unemployment recession gap: activity variables provide episodic improvements over 
the univariate model, which are sharpest if the activity variable is a recession gap.  In 
contrast to the findings in Ang, Bekaert, and Wei (2007), we find that, on average over 
our sample period, augmenting activity variable forecasts with survey measures of 
inflation expectations tends to make little difference, relative to using only the activity 
measure.  Consistent with the literature, monetary variables produce forecasts of inflation 
that are less accurate out of sample than univariate forecasts, both on average over the 
full sample and episodically. 
Before turning to our analysis, we make several remarks about the interpretation 
of our forecasting model and our results.  First, the recession gap is not a standard gap 
measure, in the sense that it measures only the severity and timing of economic 
contractions.  This paper focuses on only one part of the Phillips curve – what happens 
during downturns – and is silent about the behavior of inflation in booms. 
Second, we think of the estimated trend in (1), t|t, as capturing long-term inflation 
expectations.  The extent to which these expectations, as captured by t|t, are “anchored” 
or “resilient” is allowed to change over time.  We show in Section 3 that our trend 
measure closely tracks inflation expectations as reported by the Survey of Professional 
Forecasters.  In a sense, this should not be surprising:  it is very difficult to beat 
univariate inflation forecasting models and t|t is computed from a competitive univariate 
forecasting model that allows for time variation in the resilience of trend inflation, so it 
makes sense that the forecasts from this model would line up with professional forecasts.  
Because our trend is derived as a univariate long-run forecast, conceptually t|t differs   7
from private-sector inflation expectations, although as a practical matter this difference 
seems to be slight.
 3 
Third, our analysis focuses on backwards-looking models, in which expectations 
are in effect estimated by a reduced-form time series model.  To the extent that t|t 
captures inflationary expectations, (1) can be thought of as a New Keynesian Phillips 
Curve in which observed expectations are used for estimation.  An alternative approach is 
to use model-based expectations in conjunction with a New Keynesian Phillips curve.  
Fuhrer and Olivei (2010) provide simulations using this latter approach in the context of 
the current recession and those simulations complement the forecasting approach in this 
paper. 
There are several other recent papers related to ours.  Liu and Rudebusch (2010) 
provide different evidence that the behavior of inflation in the current downturn is 
consistent with the historical U.S. Phillips curve, and Meier (2010) provides international 
evidence that recessions are associated with declines in inflation.  Williams (2009) 
provides Phillips-curve forecasts of the decline in inflation during this recession, in which 
he emphasizes the importance of the substantial increase in expectations anchoring in 
muting the disinflationary pressures of the currently large gaps.  Giannone, Lenza, 
Momferatou, and Onorante (2010), using quite different methods, also provide evidence 
of a Euro-zone Phillips curve during the current episode. 
Section II of this paper shows that the pattern in Figure 2 also holds for core CPI, 
the GDP price index, headline PCE, and headline CPI.  Section III presents our 
                                                 
3 Our interpretation of t|t as long-term expected inflation also accords with Cogley, 
Primiceri, and Sargent (2010), who interpret t as the Fed’s inflation target and changes 
in the volatility of t as reflecting changes in Fed credibility.   8
econometric analysis of (1) using the unemployment recession gap and other 
unemployment rate gaps.  Section IV extends this analysis to other predictors.  Section V 
discusses implications for the current recession, and Section VI concludes. 
Data note.  All the data used in this paper are quarterly from 1959Q1 – 2010Q2.  
The values of monthly series are averaged over the quarter.  The data are the most recent 
revised data as of August 26, 2010.  All predictors xt are constructed to be one-sided 
using revised data; we do not consider issues raised by data revisions.  Gaps and trend 
inflation are computed using pre-1959 data for initial conditions when available.  Except 
for Section II, we focus on inflation as measured by the PCE price index less food and 
energy (core PCE) because it is methodologically consistent and because it eliminates the 
noise from energy price fluctuations, which have recently been very large (e.g. Hamilton 
[2009]); results for other inflation measures can be computed using the replication files 
that are available for this paper. 
 
II.  Price Inflation During Recessions, 1960 – 2010: Other Price Indexes 
 
In addition to core PCE inflation, other measures of price inflation also fall during 
periods of economic weakness.  Figure 3 plots the recession behavior of four-quarter 
inflation computed using four other price indexes:  core Consumer Price Index (CPI), the 
chain-weighted GDP price index, the headline PCE price index, and the headline CPI.  
The construction of Figure 3 is the same as Figure 2, except for the price index used. 
The pattern of inflation for the four price indexes in Figure 3 is similar to that 
seen using core PCE in Figure 2.  The magnitudes of the decline in inflation depend on   9
the price index.  By the time that the episode is 50% beyond the peak unemployment rate 
(a value of 1.5 on the time scale in Figure 3), four-quarter core CPI inflation has fallen by 
0.83 percentage points (SE = 0.25), inflation measured by the  GDP price index has fallen 
by 0.45 percentage points (SE = 0.27), and headline PCE and headline CPI have 
respectively declined by 0.74 (SE = 0.33) and 1.02 (SE = 0.33) percentage points.  The 
standard errors of the mean declines for headline inflation are larger than for core because 
of movements in energy and food prices that differ from one recession to the next.  
Nevertheless, the basic pattern remains the same.
4 
Because the behavior of the four inflation measures in Figure 3 matches the 
overall pattern observed for core PCE inflation in Figure 2, for the rest of this paper we 
focus solely on core PCE inflation. 
 
III. Price Inflation During Recessions, 1960 – 2010: Econometrics 
 
The graphical evidence of the previous section is suggestive but informal, so we 
now turn to an econometric investigation of price inflation during recessions.  In this 
section, we continue to focus on unemployment-based measures of activity.  We begin 
with additional details about our forecasting model (1), including our measure of trend 
                                                 
4 This pattern of inflation declines over recessions is robust to treating the 1980Q1 and 
1981Q3 recessions separately instead of treating them as a single episode; for example, 
for the core PCE 4-quarter inflation decline at time scale 1.5, the mean decline and 
standard error are unchanged to two decimal points if these two recessions are treated 
separately.  The mean declines are even robust to including the 1973Q4 recession, even 
though its special circumstances make it less relevant.  With 1973Q4 included, at time 
1.5 the mean decline in 4-quarter core PCE is 0.43 (SE = 0.15), the mean decline in core 
CPI is 0.62 (SE = 0.30), in GDP price index inflation is 0.39 (SE = 0.23), in headline 
PCE is 0.66 (SE = 0.28), and in headline CPI is 0.93 (SE = 0.29).   10
inflation, the implications of time variation in our trend estimate for the long-run slope of 
the Phillips curve, and unemployment gaps including our new unemployment recession 
gap.  We then report the results of four complementary econometric investigations.  First, 
we examine nonlinearities in the Phillips curve as suggested by recent work by Barnes 
and Olivei (2003), Stock and Watson (2009), and Fuhrer and Olivei (2010); we confirm 
that there is evidence of Barnes-Olivei (2003) nonlinearities using a standard gap 
measure, but not using the recession gap.  Second, we estimate parametric (linear) 
Phillips curve models and find that models with the recession gap exhibit less instability 
than models with conventional gaps.  Third, we conduct a pseudo out-of-sample 
forecasting study that compares various unemployment-based forecasts; all the 
unemployment gap measures exhibit the “episodic” improvements (during recessions) 
discussed in Stock and Watson (2009), but those improvements are sharpest for the 
recession gap measure.  Finally, we conduct a dynamic simulation using a full-sample 
one-quarter ahead forecasting model based on the recession gap and find that, given the 
unemployment path, the predicted inflation path matches the actual path of inflation in 
the episodes plotted in Figures 2.  This model contains only two estimated coefficients, a 
time-varying moving average parameter and a single (stable) Phillips curve slope 
coefficient.  Thus this model provides a parsimonious parametric summary of Figure 2. 
 
III.A.  Measures of Trend Inflation and Real-Time Gaps 
Trend inflation.  Implementation of (1) as a forecasting equation requires a 
measure of trend inflation computed using contemporaneous and past, but not future, data 
– that is, a one-sided measure of trend inflation.  The trend measure we use here is   11
derived from the univariate time series model of inflation developed in Stock and Watson 
(2007), in which the rate of inflation is represented as the sum of two unobserved 
components, a trend t and a transitory disturbance t, where the variances of these two 
disturbances can change over time: 
 
t = t + t,      Et = 0,  var(t) =
2
,t         ( 2 )  
t = t–1 + t,  Et = 0,  var(t) =
2
,t   , cov(t,t) = 0.     (3) 
 
The time-varying variances are modeled as evolving as independent random walks in 
logarithms.  This so-called unobserved components-stochastic volatility (UC-SV) model 
is estimated using nonlinear filtering methods, for details see Stock and Watson (2007).  
The estimate of trend inflation (t|t) which we use to estimate (1) is the one-sided (that is, 
filtered) estimate of t obtained from the UC-SV model. 
The UC-SV model implies that inflation has a time-varying moving average 
representation in first differences (a time-varying IMA(1,1) representation), 
 
t = at – tat–1,      Eat = 0,  var(at) =
2
, at  ,      ( 4 )  
 
where t and 
2
, at   are functions of 
2
,t    and 
2
,t   . 
From the perspective of inflation forecasting, the key feature of the UC-SV model 
is that, conditional on 
2
,t    and 
2
,t   , it results in a linear forecast of inflation with 
potentially long lags where the lag structure is time-varying but parsimoniously   12
parameterized by only two parameters.  The variances 
2
,t    and 
2
,t    determine the 
variability of the trend and transitory components.  Allowing these innovation variances 
to change over time produces time variation in the resilience of the trend.  In particular, a 
regime shift in monetary policy that induces a change in the extent to which expectations 
are anchored will be captured by a decrease in the variance of the trend innovation and an 
increase in the resilience of the estimated trend. 
Figure 4 presents the standard deviations  ,t    and  ,t    and the implied time-
varying moving average coefficient t for core PCE inflation.  Over the past decade, the 
volatility of the trend (,t) has been at historical lows, and the persistence of inflation 
forecasts, as measured by t, has been at historical highs.  During the 2000s, inflation 
tended to revert to a stable trend, whereas in the 70s and 80s the trend moved to track 
inflation. 
Figure 5 plots the estimated trend t|t from the UC-SV model along with the 
median 5-year ahead forecast that has been reported in the Survey of Professional 
Forecasters since 2007.  The two series move together very closely.  Although the time 
span is very short, Figure 5 suggests that the trend t|t can be thought of as a substitute 
measure of long-term inflation expectations. 
The equivalence of the unobserved components and IMA(1,1) representations 
allows a useful link between the value of  and the resilience of the trend.  Setting aside 
time variation for the moment, the filtered trend can be expressed as a distributed lag of 
past inflation, specifically,  











  .           ( 5 )  
 
The weights in this expression sum to one, and the smaller is , the more weight is placed 
on recent observations and the more volatile is the trend.  In the limit that  approaches 
one, the estimated trend is simply the sample average of past inflation. 
From (1) to a backwards-looking Phillips curve with time-varying parameters.   
In the UC-SV model, t|t is the optimal univariate time-t forecast of t+h for all h  1, so 
that at+1 = t+1 – t|t, where at is the forecast error in (4), the MA(1) version of the 
univariate model.  We consider the possibility that this univariate forecast error is 
predictable using some variable xt, so that at+1 = 1xt + 
1
1 t e  , where the 
subscript/superscript “1” indicates that 1 and 
1
1 t e   apply to this 1-step ahead projection.  
This yields the one-step ahead model, 
 
t+1 = t|t + 1xt + 
1
1 t e  .        ( 6 )  
 
If we continue ignore time variation in , then substituting (5) into (6) and rearranging 











   + 1xt + 
1
1 t e  ,       ( 7 )  
   14
Equation (7) is just a tightly parameterized backwards-looking Phillips curve forecasting 
model with potentially long lags in the tradition of Gordon (1982, 1990, 1998) and 
Brayton, Roberts, and Williams (1999), without the dummy variables and supply shock 
variables found in the Gordon (1990) “triangle” model. 
Equation (7) provides a useful framework for understanding two implications of 
time variation in  (with time variation, (7) is an approximation which holds for slow 
time variation).   First, time variation in  implies time variation in the Phillips curve 
coefficients on lagged inflation.  Second, time variation in  implies time variation in the 
long-run slope of the Phillips curve.  Specifically, the long-run effect on inflation of a 
unit exogenous change in xt is (1 – )1.  Thus, even if 1 is constant (we provide 
evidence below that this is so, when xt is the unemployment recession gap), the long-run 
effect on inflation varies over time because  varies over time.  In particular, when  is 
large (close to one), then the long-run Phillips curve is flatter than when  is small.  Said 
differently, when the innovations to trend inflation are relatively small – that is, when 
inflation expectations are well-anchored – then  is near one.  Even if the one-quarter 
ahead effect of a change in xt on inflation is constant over time, the anchoring of 
expectations means that the long-run impact of a change in xt is less than if expectations 
were less well anchored. 
Iterating (4) forward four quarters yields 
4
4 t   = t|t + bt+4 or, equivalently, 
4




ti i  

     + bt+4 where bt+4 = [at+4 + (2–)at+3 + (3–2)at+2 + (4–3)at+1]/4.  As in 
the 1-step forecast, consider the possibility that future univariate forecast errors at+1, at+2,   15
at+3, and at+4 (and thus bt+4) are predictable using xt, so that bt+4 = 4xt + 
4
4 t e  .  Thus we 
have that 
4
4 t   = t|t + 4xt + 
4
4 t e  , which is (1), or equivalently, 
4









   + 4xt + 
4
4 t e  .      ( 8 )  
When derived in this way the coefficient 4 in (8) is seen to depend on  because bt+4 is a 
function of .
5  Thus, time variation in  may lead to time variation in 4 even if 1 is time 
invariant. 
Real-time gaps.  A challenge in forecasting inflation using activity variables is 
constructing reliable one-sided measures of activity gaps, which can differ substantially 
from two-sided gaps estimated with the benefit of subsequent data.  Here, we consider 
two one-sided gaps, one standard in the literature and one new, plus a “differences” 
transformation of activity.  
The new one-sided gap measure, which we refer to as a “recession gap,” focuses 
attention on economic downturns by computing the gap as the deviation of 
unemployment from its minimum over the current and previous 11 quarters.  That is, the 
unemployment recession gap is, 
 
unemployment recession gapt = ut – min(ut,…, ut–11),   (9) 
 
where ut denotes the unemployment rate at date t.  In effect, the unemployment recession 
gap takes on the value of the unemployment rate in Figure 2 during downturns, and is 
                                                 
5 Let j = Eat+jxt.  From expression for bt+4, 4 = [4 + (2–)3 + (3–2)2 + (4–3)1]/4.   16
zero otherwise.  Thus, the unemployment recession gap translates Figure 2 into 
something that can be analyzed using linear regression.
6  
We also examine a conventional one-sided gap computed using a one-sided 
bandpass filter.  Following Stock and Watson (2007), one-sided band-pass gaps are 
computed as the deviation of the series augmented with univariate forecasts of future 
values from a symmetric two-sided MA(80) approximation to the optimal lowpass filter 
with pass band corresponding to periodicities of at least 60 quarters. 
The third unemployment-based predictor we consider is a difference (or changes) 
transformation, in which the predictor is the four-quarter change in the unemployment 
rate, ut – ut–4. 
Figure 6 plots the unemployment rate and these three unemployment-based 
measures.  The three measures have broad similarities but important differences.  Most 
notably, the bandpass and differences measures vary during economic expansions, 
whereas the recession gap essentially varies only during downturns.  
 
                                                 
6 Our unemployment recession gap is related to two distinct literatures.  The first 
concerns hysteresis in the Phillips curve and in the labor market (for a recent contribution 
and references, see Ball (2009)).  If our recession gap is interpreted as a conventional 
gap, then the NAIRU is modeled as the running three-year minimum of the 
unemployment rate, which tends to drift down slowly in expansions and to adjust 
upwards after long contractions.  We take no stand on such an interpretation and prefer to 
think of the unemployment recession gap as simply translating Figure 2 into a variable 
that can be studied using regressions.   The second related literature is on nonlinearities in 
the univariate output process.  Specifically, Beaudry and Koop (1993) propose a variable, 
the “current depth of recession,” which is the difference between current real GNP and its 
historical maximum value.  Our implementation differs from theirs in several ways.  
First, we consider the unemployment rate, not real GNP, and when we construct 
recession gaps using output measures we use local detrending (see Section 4.1).  Second, 
our unemployment rate minimum is for a 3-year rolling window for instead all of history.  
Third, Beaudry and Koop (1993) apply their measure to nonlinearities in the univariate 
output process, whereas our focus is models of inflation.   17
III.B  Nonlinearities in the Phillips Curve 
Does the Phillips curve slope depend on the size of the gap?  Figure 7 provides 
scatterplots of 
4
4 t    – t|t against the 1-sided bandpass gap (upper panel) and the 
unemployment recession gap (lower panel).  Both panels also show a nonparametric 
kernel regression line (with 95% confidence bands) and a parametric regression function.  
Barnes and Olivei (2003) found evidence supporting a piecewise linear Phillips curve, so 
for the one-sided bandpass regression the parametric regression is a piecewise linear 
function, with the thresholds chosen so that 70% of the observations fall in the middle 
section and 15% in each outer section.  The parametric regression in the recession gap 
scatterplot is linear. 
Figure 7 provides support for the Barnes-Olivei (2003) specification applied to 
the one-sided bandpass gap:  the Barnes-Olivei (2003) type piecewise linear function is 
remarkably close to the nonparametric regression function.  There is a large central 
region – normal times of moderate and small gaps – in which the Phillips relation is 
essentially flat, but in periods of large (bandpass) gaps, the curve steepens.
7  In the 
pseudo out-of-sample forecasting exercise reported below we therefore consider both 
linear and nonlinear (nonparametric) specifications for the bandpass gap. 
In contrast, there is little evidence of nonlinearities in the Phillips curve using the 
recession gap, so the work below adopts a linear specification as a function of the 
recession gap. 
                                                 
7 The evidence for a piecewise nonlinear Phillips curve is stronger using a non-
forecasting specification in which the unemployment gap dating overlaps with the dating 
of the dependent variable.   18
Does the Phillips curve slope depend on the level of inflation?  The possibility 
that the Phillips curve flattens at low levels of inflation has long been an element of the 
literature, see for example Ball, Mankiw, and Romer (1988), Akerlof, Dickens, and Perry 
(1996) (on downward wage rigidity) and, for a recent empirical treatment, Aron and 
Muellbauer (2010).  We investigated this type of nonlinearity, in which the slope of the 
Phillips curve, specifically 4 in (1), depends on the level of inflation; here, we focus on 
the recession gap Phillips curve.   
  Figure 8 presents a nonparametric estimate of the slope 4 (the coefficient on the 
unemployment recession gap) as a function of the current estimate of trend inflation 
(t|t).
8  The estimated slope is clearly less in absolute value for small values of trend 
inflation than for large values, however the 95% confidence bands are wide and the full-
sample linear regression estimate of -0.18 is contained within the confidence band for 
almost all values of trend inflation.  Parametric models incorporating this nonlinearity do 
not seem to be particularly robust, with the statistical significance of the nonlinearity 
depending on the details of the specification.  One reason for this imprecision and 
apparent lack of robustness is that there is limited historical experience at very low levels 
of inflation, so the evidence we have essentially rests on two historical episodes, the early 
1960s and the early 2000s.  This imprecision and lack of robustness is underscored by 
pseudo out-of-sample forecasting experiments (not reported) in which specifications in 
which the slope depends on t|t were found to exhibit instability. 
                                                 
8The slope was estimated by local linear regression of (1) using a biweight kernel as a 
function of t|t – , where  appears on the horizontal axis of Figure 8, with a bandwidth 
of 1.3.   19
Because the time series evidence is limited, we also consider evidence from the 
micro literature on price setting.  One argument for a flattening of the Phillips curve at 
low levels of inflation is that there is resistance to reducing nominal wages and prices.  
The micro literature, however, presents little evidence of a price change floor at zero.  For 
example Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) find that one-third of price changes for the 
same goods are negative, a finding consistent with Klenow and Kryvtsov (2008).  Some 
additional evidence on whether the distribution of price changes truncates or piles up at 
zero is provided in Appendix A, which examines annual price changes for 233 
disaggregated components of the PCE price index.  Price changes at this level of 
disaggregation accord with the micro finding of little price resistance at zero.  While the 
absence of resistance to price declines does not imply an absence of resistance to wage 
declines, this micro and subaggregate evidence does not on its face suggest that a price 
Phillips curve would flatten at low levels of inflation. 
Given the limited evidence in the time series data and the lack of evident price 
resistance at zero in the micro and subaggregate data, for the rest of this paper we adopt 
specifications in which the Phillips curve slope does not depend on the level of inflation.  
This said, the hint of nonlinearity in Figure 8 remains an intriguing topic for further 
research. 
 
III.C  Gap Models: Estimates and Stability 
Table 1 reports various regression statistics for estimates of 1 in (6) (one-quarter 
ahead) and 4 in (1) (4-quarter ahead) using the three unemployment gaps.  All R
2s are 
low, underscoring that inflation is difficult to forecast.  The final two columns report   20
statistics testing for stability of the slope coefficient, first by testing for a break in 
1984Q1 (a common choice for the Great Moderation break) and second using the Quandt 
Likelihood Ratio (QLR) statistic (also known as the sup-F statistic) testing for a single 
break at an unknown time.  For the one-step ahead regressions, these test statistics fail to 
reject the null hypothesis of coefficient stability.  The one-step ahead point estimates of 1 
for the unemployment recession gap and the R
2 also indicate stability of this predictive 
regression.  In contrast, the coefficients on the one-sided bandpass gap and the fourth 
difference change by a large factor across the subsamples, as do the regression R
2s, 
suggesting less stability than the unemployment recession gap regression despite the 
failure of the stability tests to reject for any of the one-step ahead specifications.  
Consistent with the discussion in Section 3.1, the estimates of 4 in the four-step ahead 
regression appear less stable than in the one-step ahead specification.  Indeed, both 
stability tests reject for the four-quarter ahead bandpass gap and fourth-differences 
specifications, and the estimated coefficients and R
2s change dramatically for these two 
measures from the pre-84 to post-84 parts of the sample.   In contrast, the hypothesis of 
stability is not rejected for the recession gap coefficient in the four-quarter ahead 
specification, the magnitude of its change is small relative to the other variables, and its 
R
2 is stable across the two samples.  
 
III.D  Pseudo Out-of-Sample Forecasting Results 
The pseudo out-of-sample forecasting method.  This section examines the 
forecasting performance of the three unemployment variables, relative to the univariate 
UC-SV benchmark, in a pseudo out-of-sample forecast experiment.  At a given date t,   21
forecasts of 
4
4 t    using each model are made using data only available through date t.  For 
the exercise here, the first forecast date is the later of 1970Q1 or the date necessary for 
the shortest regression to have 40 observations, and the final forecast date is four quarters 
before the end of the sample. 
A useful statistic is the centered rolling root mean forecast error (RMSE).  This is 
the square root of a weighted moving average of the squared pseudo out-of-sample 
forecast error, centered so that the moving average extends seven quarters on either side.
9  
Figure 9 presents rolling RMSEs, the rolling RMSEs relative to the rolling RMSE 
of the UC-SV model, and the pseudo out-of-sample forecasts for the three unemployment 
gap models.  Because of the possible nonlinearity in the Phillips curve using the bandpass 
gap, for that gap forecasts were computed using both a linear model and a nonparametric 
nonlinear forecast (the predicted value is read off the recursively estimated nonparametric 
regression curve). 
Five findings are apparent in Figure 9.  As is documented in the next section, 
these results are robust to using other activity measures and including other variables, so 
we spend some time discussing them here. 
1.  Consistent with findings elsewhere in the literature, there is considerable 
variation over time in the predictability of inflation.  In 2006, the rolling 
RMSEs were near historic lows, but they have recently crept up to levels of 
the early 1990s. 
                                                 
9Specifically, following Stock and Watson (2009), the rolling RMSE is computed as 
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21(|x|1).   22
2.  The forecasting improvements made by Phillips curve forecasts are episodic, 
and the greatest improvements are evident in downturns.  This finding is 
similar to that in Stock and Watson (2009). 
3.  The recession gap model improves upon the UC-SV model during the 
disinflations of the early 1980s, the early 1990s, and (by a smaller margin) 
during the current recession.  The only two periods in which the recession gap 
model does relatively poorly is during 1976-7 and 2004.  Both of these 
failures correspond to the unusual periods observed in Figure 1:  the increase 
in inflation following the 1973Q4 recession, and the increase in inflation 
during 2004 which (as can be seen in Figure 2) was atypical for this stage of 
the business cycle. 
4.  The fourth-difference forecasts substantially improve upon the recession gap 
forecasts only during 2004-2005, when the slow decline of unemployment led 
to forecasts of increasing inflation, whereas the recession gap forecasts had 
inflation falling. 
5.  The nonparametric nonlinear forecasts made using the one-sided bandpass 
gap, which appeared promising based on the analysis of Section III.B, end up 
differing little from the UC-SV forecasts.  The linear bandpass gap forecasts 
provide smaller improvements during downturns than the recession gap 
forecasts, and provide essentially no improvements over the UC-SV model 
during the current downturn.  The reason for this is that the 1-sided gap 
estimate at the end of the sample heavily weights the current unemployment   23
rate, so by this measure the unemployment gap has been small (less than two 
percentage points) throughout this recession, see Figure 6(b). 
 
III.E  Parametric Dynamic Simulations 
We now turn to the question of whether the unemployment gap model is 
quantitatively consistent with the paths of inflation in Figures 1 and 2, given the observed 
path in unemployment.  To address this question we conduct a dynamic simulation using 
the one-quarter ahead regression (6) in which xt is the unemployment recession gap, 
using the full-sample estimate of 1 reported in Table 1.  The simulation allows   to vary 
across episodes by using the estimated value of t at each episode’s NBER peak date.  
We conduct the dynamic simulation by computing the value of t for the months over the 
recessionary episode plotted in Figure 2, given the path of unemployment.
10  Note that, 
except for initialization at the NBER peak, no actual values of inflation enter the 
simulation. 
The dynamic simulation paths differ by episode both because the unemployment 
paths differ and because  varies over time.  When  is large, there will be more inertia in 
trend inflation so that while a given value of xt has a constant effect on one-quarter 
inflation, four-quarter inflation will fall by less than it would were  smaller. 
The dynamic simulation results, along with one standard error confidence bands, 
are presented in Figure 10.  Two conclusions are evident.  First, the predicted paths of 
                                                 
10 This is equivalent to using a VAR to compute the response of inflation to a sequence of 
unemployment shocks chosen to match the episode-specific path of unemployment in 
Figure 1, under the restriction that lagged inflation does not enter the unemployment 
equation, and using the nonlinear recession gap transformation to link the unemployment 
path and the inflation path.  The restriction that lagged inflation does not enter the 
unemployment equation is not rejected at the 10% level.   24
inflation are similar to actual inflation in the 1960Q2, 1969Q4, 1980Q1, and 1990Q3 
episodes.  Second, the inflation path also is fairly close to its predicted value during the 
2001Q1 episode through the peak of unemployment, but thereafter drifts upwards and 
away from the predicted continued disinflation.  By 2004Q4, the dynamic simulation 
predicts the 4-quarter inflation rate to have fallen since 2001Q1 by 0.6 percentage points, 
when in fact it rose by 0.5 percentage points.  The standard error band for this episode is 
wide, but the increase in inflation falls outside that band. 
 
IV. Other Predictors 
 
This section examines the pseudo out-of-sample forecasting performance of other activity 
variables, activity variables augmented by survey expectations, and monetary variables.  
In many cases we focus on performance of the median forecast within a category (e.g. 
recession gap activity variables) both to streamline presentation and because of the well-
known virtues of forecast pooling. 
 
IV.A  Other Activity Variables 
Table 2 summarizes the pseudo out-of-sample forecasting performance of six 
activity variables (the unemployment rate, the capacity utilization rate, real GDP, the 
index of industrial production, employment, and the Chicago Fed National Activity Index 
[CFNAI]), each subject to three gap or changes transformations (recession gaps, one-  25
sided bandpass gaps, and fourth differences).
11  Figure 11 plots the rolling RMSEs and 
forecasts of the median combined forecast, by gap transformation. 
Table 2 and Figure 11 largely confirm the findings based on the analysis of the 
unemployment rate discussed in Section 3.4.  The forecasts based on the various activity 
variables tend to move together (for a given gap transformation).  On average, the 
Phillips curve forecasts offer little improvement over the UC-SV benchmark, but they do 
offer improvements in recessionary episodes.  The exception, again, is 2004, in which all 
the activity variable forecasts perform poorly relative to the UC-SV benchmark. 
 
IV.B. Expectations 
The models analyzed so far are variants of backwards-looking Phillips curves.  
Although we have interpreted t|t as reflecting expectations (t|t is the optimal long-term 
forecast of inflation from the UC-SV model), the empirical models do not explicitly 
incorporate forward-looking expectations.  Expectations can be incorporated into Phillips 
curve forecasts either as model-based expectations (forecasts obtained using a model that 
includes a New Keynesian Phillips curve) or by using survey- or market-based 
expectations.  Here, we consider the effect on the activity-based forecasts of Section 4.1 
of adding survey expectations as an additional predictor in (1).  Although market-based 
                                                 
11 GDP, industrial production, employment, and the CFNAI were initially transformed by 
taking logarithms.  The capacity utilization rate recession gap was computed as the 
negative of the deviation of the capacity utilization rate from its maximum value over the 
current and previous eleven quarters.  The recession gaps for the remaining four series 
were computed by first computing a recursive locally detrended series, then setting the 
recession gap to be the negative of the deviation of the detrended series from its 
maximum value over the current and previous eleven quarters.   26
expectations are an appealing alternative approach, we do not use them here because of 
complications introduced by liquidity effects in the TIPS market. 
We consider five real-time survey measures of inflation expectations:  the Survey 
of Professional Forecasters (SPF) forecasts of GDP inflation 1 year ahead; the SPF 
forecast of CPI inflation 1 and 10 years ahead; and the University of Michigan survey 
forecast of inflation expectations 1 year ahead and 5-10 years ahead.  Because these 
series are persistent, we analyze them as expectation gaps, that is, deviations from UC-
SV trend CPI inflation (the SFP GDP inflation forecast is deviated from the GDP 
inflation trend).
12 
The results, presented as median combination forecasts across the various 
expectations measures, are summarized in Table 3.  Figure 12 examines forecasts based 
on the unemployment recession gap augmented by individual survey forecasts, as well as 
the median survey-augmented unemployment recession gap forecast.  The results in 
Figure 12 are striking and typical.  Throughout almost all of the sample, the survey 
measures introduce negligible changes to the recession gap forecast. 
 
IV.C. Monetary Aggregates 
                                                 
12 Using the notation of (1), the regression estimated is 
4
4 t    – t|t = xt + (
e
t   –  |
e
tt  ) + 
4
e
t e  , where  |
e
tt   is the trend used to detrend the inflation expectation 
e
t  .  Were the two 
trends the same so t|t =  |
e
tt  , this regression would simplify to 
4
4 t    = 
e
t   + (1–)t|t + xt  
+  4
e
t e  , which is a Mincer-Zarnowitz forecast comparison regression comparing the 
survey forecast  |
e
tt   and the UC-SV model forecast t|t, augmented with xt.  Because 
4
4 t    
is core PCE inflation and the survey detrending uses either CPI or the GDP price index, 
the two trends are not the same, but this algebra suggests that the regression can still be 
given a Mincer-Zarnowitz forecast combination interpretation.   27
Table 4 and Figure 13 summarize the results of pseudo out-of-sample forecasts 
based on four monetary aggregates, with four transformations each.  Unlike all previous 
models, these specifications include lagged values of xt (here, money) as well as current 
values; lag lengths were chosen recursively by the Akaike Information Criterion.  The 
recursive forecasts exhibit instability and have greater RMSEs by decade than the UC-SV 
model or the activity-based models.  There are no episodes in which the monetary 
predictors outperform the UC-SV model.  Because the coefficients are estimated to be 
small, the median combination forecasts are essentially the UC-SV forecast, with noise 
added.  As the second part of Table 4 indicates, the qualitative findings are the same for 
two-year ahead forecasts of inflation as for one-year ahead forecasts.  This negative 
assessment and indications of instability are consistent with the studies of monetary 
models of inflation at longer horizon by Sargent and Surico (2008) and Benati (2010).  
This is not to say that monetary expansions and inflation are unrelated, rather, the 
evidence here is that the predictive relationship between money and inflation is weak and 
unstable at short to medium horizons. 
 
V. The Current Recession 
 
V.A.  Energy and Housing 
Before turning to the implications of this analysis for the current recession, we 
briefly consider the implications of energy and housing prices for core PCE inflation over 
the past several years.   28
Oil price pass-through.  As discussed in the introduction, the volatility of oil 
prices since 2007 is an important reason that we have focused on core inflation in this 
paper.  The question remains, however, about the extent to which energy price increases 
are passed through to core inflation.  Hooker (2002) provides evidence that oil price 
increases led to increases in core inflation during the 1970s, but that after 1981 the extent 
of pass-through declined significantly.  Hooker (2002) focused on the oil coefficients in 
triangle-type Phillips curve specifications, with a full-sample estimate of the NAIRU. 
We reexamine the extent of energy price pass-through using a simpler 
specification than Hooker (2003) which does not involve a NAIRU assumption.  Table 5 
reports the cumulative coefficients in a distributed lag regression of quarterly inflation in 
headline PCE (panel A) and core PCE (panel B) on current and eight quarterly lagged 
values of PCE energy inflation.  During the 1970s, the pass-through of energy prices to 
headline PCE was approximately twice energy’s share.  Unlike Hooker, we find that the 
effect of energy prices on headline inflation is twice energy’s share during the 1980s and 
early 1990s, although the cumulative pass-through to core is not statistically significant.  
During the past 15 years, however, the pass-through of energy to headline inflation has 
occurred in the initial quarter and equals energy’s (declining) share, and the dynamic 
pass-through to core is precisely estimated to be zero.
13  Thus, although the methods and 
samples are different, the results in Table 5 largely confirm Hooker’s (2002) conclusion, 
although perhaps the reduction in pass-through occurred more gradually through the 
1980s and early 1990s than Hooker (2002) estimates.  Concerning the current recession, 
                                                 
13 The dynamic multipliers in the final column of Table 5B imply that the cumulative 
effect of energy price changes from 2007Q4 to 2010Q1 on core PCE inflation is a net 
reduction of core PCE inflation by 0.02 percentage points (2 basis points).   29
we therefore proceed to focus on core PCE inflation without special concern that the 
results are being distorted by energy prices, despite their recent large fluctuations. 
Housing.  Housing prices have fallen dramatically and, with a lag, so have the 
rents and owner-equivalent rents which enter PCE inflation.  This raises the possibility 
that the collapse of housing prices, an important feature of this recession, might be 
driving measured declines in inflation.  Hobijn, Eusepi, and Tambalotti (2010) examined 
the extent to which movements in the housing component of core PCE is exceptional 
over the past several years.  They find that while the housing component has dropped, so 
have the other components of core PCE, and the differences between core PCE and core 
PCE excluding housing are negligible over 2008 and 2009.  We therefore continue to 
focus on core PCE, with no special treatment of housing prices. 
 
V.B.  Forecasts and Dynamic Simulations 
The dynamic simulation for the current recession is presented in Figure 14.  The 
dynamic simulation uses the August 2010 SPF forecasted path of unemployment for 
quarters 2010Q3-2011Q3.  Currently the path of inflation is on the conditional mean of 
the dynamic simulation, after initially dropping more sharply than the simulation path 
then increasing slightly.  Based on the SPF forecasted path of unemployment, by 2011Q3 
the 4-quarter rate of core PCE inflation is expected to drop another 0.5 percentage points 
from its 2010Q2 value of 1.5%. 
The four-quarter ahead forecasts using the estimated regression (1) and the 
unemployment recession gap (or the activity recession gaps) have generally tracked the 
downward movement of inflation over this recession, although the forecasts did not   30
match the timing.  The sharpest falls in inflation in this recession occurred from 2008Q3 
to 2009Q3, and the pseudo out-of-sample forecasts of four-quarter inflation over this 
period (made four quarters prior to this decline) missed the decline and forecasted the 
decline to occur later because unemployment did not start to rise substantially until 
2008Q3. 
The projections based on the dynamic simulation are consistent with direct four-
quarter ahead forecasts using the estimates of (1) reported in the previous sections.  The 
unemployment recession gap model, both alone and the median expectations-augmented 
forecast, forecast a decline in the rate of 4-quarter core PCE inflation of 0.8 percentage 
points from 2010Q2-2011Q2.  The median forecast over all recession gap activity 
variables indicates a somewhat smaller decline, by 0.6 percentage points over this period. 
We stress that there is considerable uncertainty surrounding these point estimates 
of further declines in inflation.  The standard error bands in Figure 14 are consistent with 
declines that are considerably more modest or much more severe.  One important source 
of uncertainty is how variable trend inflation currently is.  For example, according to the 
dynamic simulation, if  were to take on a value one standard error below its estimated 
value in 2007Q4, then the predicted decline in the rate of 4-quarter PCE inflation from 
2010Q2 to 2011Q2 would be 0.9 percentage points instead of 0.5 percentage points.  The 
decline along the lower confidence band in Figure 14 (which reflects uncertainty in both 
 and ) from 2010Q2 to 2011Q2 is steeper, 1.2 percentage points.  The standard error 
bands in Figure 14 understate the uncertainty because they only incorporate estimation 
uncertainty and ignore future shock uncertainty.   31
The range of these declines in inflation is similar to that reported in Fuhrer and 
Olivei (2010) based on the entirely different and complementary approach of solving for 
model-based expectations with inflation determined by a New Keynesian Phillips Curve. 
 
VI. Discussion and Conclusion 
 
We have suggested that the empirical regularity of Figure 2 – that U.S. recessions 
are associated with declines in inflation – can be captured by a simple model in which the 
deviation of core inflation from a long-run (statistical) trend is predicted by a new 
measure, the unemployment recession gap.  Regressions using this gap measure appear to 
be stable based on standard statistical tests, although we point this out with trepidation 
because the history of the inflation forecasting literature is one of apparently stable 
relationships falling apart upon publication.  As the dynamic simulations in Figures 9 and 
13 show, this model does a reasonable job of matching inflation dynamics given only the 
path of unemployment over a recessionary episode. 
The results in this paper need to be understood in the context of three important 
sources of uncertainty.  The first pertains to uncertainty within our econometric model.  
In that model, the long-term movement of inflation in response to a given short-term 
decline in activity depends on the volatility of the trend component of inflation: if the 
trend is resilient then inflation reverts to the trend, but if the trend is volatile then the 
trend tracks inflation.  Both regimes are present in the record over the past 50 years.  The 
volatility of trend inflation is currently at historically low levels, although at the very end   32
of the sample it is inching up.  An increase in that volatility, holding constant the 
volatility of the transitory component, would make the inflation path in Figure 14 steeper. 
Second, making projections in the current recession requires extrapolating to rates 
of inflation at the edge of or outside the range of the data.  There are some hints that the 
slope parameter 4 might be smaller in absolute value at low levels of inflation (Figure 8), 
but these hints are not robustly confirmed by statistical tests.  Moreover, inflation 
dynamics could change in the region in which conventional monetary policy becomes 
ineffective and the parametric model could be ill-equipped to handle this. 
Third, there is a key episode that does not match the historical regularity, the 
increase in inflation in late 2003 through 2004.  This increase occurred despite the 
“jobless recovery” in which the unemployment rate lingered for quarters near its peak.  
Because the unemployment rate remained high, the recession gap model predicted falling 
inflation over 2004 when in fact the four-quarter rate of inflation increased by 0.7 
percentage points from 1.5% in 2003Q4 to 2.2% in 2004Q4.  As late as August 2003, the 
FOMC minutes record concern about continuing declines in inflation.
14  There are two 
leading explanations for this increase.  The first is that the increase stemmed from special 
                                                 
14 “Committee members generally perceived the upside and downside risks to the 
attainment of sustainable growth for the next few quarters as roughly equal; however, 
they viewed the probability, though minor, of a substantial and unwelcome fall in 
inflation as exceeding that of a pickup in inflation from its already low level. On balance, 
the Committee believed that the concern about appreciable disinflation was likely to 
predominate for the foreseeable future.” FOMC minutes, August 12, 2003.  Billi (2009) 
argues that, in hindsight, the inflation “scare” of 2003 was overstated: real-time estimates 
of core PCE inflation indicated inflation falling through the end of 2003 to under 1% per 
year, while the fully revised estimates now available show that core PCE inflation started 
to increase in mid-2003 and reached 2% by early 2004.  Our interest here is not the 
confusion caused by these large data revisions, but the puzzling increase in core inflation 
in late 2003 and early 2004 in the fully revised data.  Also see Dokko et. al. (2009) for an 
analysis of real-time monetary policy during this period.   33
factors and price increases external to the U.S. economy, which in turn passed through to 
core inflation.  This explanation is the one put forward at contemporaneous FOMC 
meetings.  According to the minutes from the spring and summer of 2004, the increase in 
core inflation during early 2004 was largely attributed to energy costs (which had risen 
sharply) and to a depreciation of the dollar.
15  The energy price part of this explanation, 
however, does not square with the econometric evidence that the pass-through from oil 
prices to core was zero on average from 1995 to 2006 (Table 5).  Although housing 
prices were increasing sharply during 2004, the housing component of PCE did not start 
to increase substantially until the end of 2005, well after the unexplained rise in inflation 
in 2004. 
The second leading explanation of 2004 is that this was an episode of successful 
expectations management by the Fed, in which market participants expected core 
inflation to increase (perhaps because of a perceived increase in the Fed’s inflation 
target), and this expectation led to an actual increase in inflation.  Interestingly, we can 
find no allusion to this mechanism in the FOMC minutes from the period.  Throughout 
this episode ten-year inflationary expectations remained steady, and incorporating 
inflationary expectations improves upon the unemployment recession gap forecasts for 
these years; however, we are reluctant to read too much into this improvement because 
including inflationary expectations produced worse forecasts on average for the decade 
and on average over the full sample.  At the moment, we are sympathetic to the “special 
factors” explanation, in large part because that is the explanation offered by 
                                                 
15 Dokko et. al. (2009) document that the FOMC projection for 2004 inflation (headline 
PCE) in the Monetary Report to Congress at the start of 2004 was 2 percentage points 
below realized 2004 inflation, and states that this “miss is partly explained by an 
unexpected jump in the price of oil that year” (p. 14).   34
contemporary observers including the FOMC, but ambiguity about this episode remains.  
Absent an explanation for the rise in inflation in 2004, we cannot rule out a similar 
fortuitous rise in the remaining quarters of the current episode, but neither can we be 
confident it will happen again.   35
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Notes:  The one-quarter ahead regressions are t+1 – t|t = 1xt + 
1
4 t e  , and the 4-quarter 
ahead regressions are  
4
4 t    – t|t = 4xt + 
4
4 t e  , where xt is a predictor known at date t.  The 
first six numeric columns present the estimates of 1 (or 4, as appropriate), its standard 
error (in parentheses), and the regression R
2 for the row predictor and column sample.  
Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust for one-quarter ahead regressions and are 
Newey-West standard errors (6 lags) for four-quarter ahead regressions.  The QLR (sup-
Chow) statistic was computed using symmetric 15% trimming.  If the QLR test rejects 
stability, the estimated break date appears in parentheses.  The t-statistic in the second to 
last column is significant at the *5% **1% significance level.  
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Table 2.  Relative root mean squared error of activity-based pseudo out-of-sample 
forecasts of 4-quarter core PCE inflation, relative to UC-SV model.   
 
 
Series  1970Q1 –  
2010.Q1 
1970Q1 –  
1979.Q4 






UC-SV (RMSE)  0.97 (158)  1.61 (40)  0.86 (40)  0.45 (40)  0.39 (38) 
A.  Recession  gaps       
Unemployment  0.98 (158)  1.01 (40)  0.85 (40)  0.79 (40)  1.20 (38) 
Capacity utilization  0.94 (127)  1.03 (9)  0.85 (40)  0.87 (40)  1.22 (38) 
GDP  0.98 (158)  1.03 (40)  0.82 (40)  0.78 (40)  1.18 (38) 
Industrial production  0.98 (158)  1.01 (40) 0.86  (40) 0.82  (40) 1.24  (38) 
Employment  0.99 (158)  1.00 (40)  0.83 (40)  0.84 (40)  1.55 (38) 
CFNAI  1.01 (94)  (0)  1.04 (16)  0.77 (40)  1.24 (38) 
Median recession gap  0.97 (158)  1.01 (40)  0.84 (40)  0.78 (40)  1.22 (38) 
B.  1-sided bandpass gaps           
Unemployment  0.98 (158)  0.98 (40)  0.97 (40)  0.96 (40)  1.08 (38) 
Capacity utilization  0.93 (127)  0.80 (9)  0.93 (40)  1.00 (40)  1.10 (38) 
GDP  0.95 (158)  0.96 (40)  0.90 (40)  0.87 (40)  1.11 (38) 
Industrial production  0.97 (158)  0.97 (40) 0.91  (40) 0.97  (40) 1.19  (38) 
Employment  0.99 (158)  0.99 (40)  0.98 (40)  0.95 (40)  1.13 (38) 
CFNAI  0.90 (126)  0.81 (8)  0.88 (40)  0.92 (40)  1.14 (38) 
Median BP gap  0.96 (158)  0.97 (40)  0.91 (40)  0.94 (40)  1.11 (38) 
C.  4-quarter  differences       
Unemployment  0.96 (158)  0.94 (40)  0.99 (40)  0.99 (40)  1.06 (38) 
Capacity utilization  1.05 (123)  0.94 (5)  1.06 (40)  1.08 (40)  1.16 (38) 
GDP  0.96 (158)  0.95 (40)  0.97 (40)  0.96 (40)  1.12 (38) 
Industrial production  0.97 (158)  0.96 (40) 0.93  (40) 1.03  (40) 1.19  (38) 
Employment  0.94 (158)  0.91 (40)  0.90 (40)  0.89 (40)  1.52 (38) 
CFNAI  1.05 (122)  0.87 (4)  1.02 (40)  1.02 (40)  1.48 (38) 
Median recession gap  0.96 (158)  0.94 (40)  0.97 (40)  0.96 (40)  1.18 (38) 
Overall median – all activity  0.95 (158)  0.97 (40)  0.86 (40)  0.86 (40)  1.12 (38) 
 
Notes:   The first line reports the standard deviation of the UC-SV forecast errors over the 
column sample period; the remaining lines report the ratio of the row forecast RMSE to 
the US-SV RMSE over the column sample.  Numbers of observations used in the 
computation are given in parentheses.  CFNAI denotes the Chicago Fed National Activity 
Index.   42
Table 3.  Relative root mean squared error of expectations-augmented activity 
pseudo out-of-sample forecasts of 4-quarter core PCE inflation, relative to activity 
variables alone.   
 
Series  1970Q1 –  
2010.Q1 
1970Q1 –  
1979.Q4 






A.  Recession  gaps       
Unemployment  1.06 (113 )  (0)  1.10 (35 )  0.97 (40 )  1.04 (38 ) 
Capacity utilization  1.06 (113 )  (0)  1.10 (35 )  1.00 (40 )  1.02 (38 ) 
GDP  1.06 (113 )  (0)  1.09 (35 )  0.98 (40 )  1.03 (38 ) 
Industrial production  1.05 (113 )  (0)  1.08 (35 )  0.96 (40 )  1.07 (38 ) 
Employment  1.00 (113 )  (0)  1.03 (35 )  1.01 (40 )  0.96 (38 ) 
CFNAI  1.01 (94 )  (0)  0.97 (16 )  1.01 (40 )  1.04 (38 ) 
Median recession gap  1.05 (113 )  (0)  1.08 (35 )  0.99 (40 )  1.02 (38 ) 
B.  1-sided bandpass gaps           
Unemployment  1.08 (113 )  (0)  1.12 (35 )  1.03 (40 )  0.99 (38 ) 
Capacity utilization  1.08 (113 )  (0)  1.14 (35 )  1.03 (40 )  0.97 (38 ) 
GDP  1.01 (113 )  (0)  1.03 (35 )  1.02 (40 )  0.96 (38 ) 
Industrial production  1.03 (113 )  (0)  1.07 (35 )  1.05 (40 )  0.94 (38 ) 
Employment  1.06 (113 )  (0)  1.09 (35 )  1.01 (40 )  1.03 (38 ) 
CFNAI  1.08 (113 )  (0)  1.14 (35 )  1.05 (40 )  0.96 (38 ) 
Median BP gap  1.06 (113 )  (0)  1.10 (35 )  1.04 (40 )  0.98 (38 ) 
C.  4-quarter  differences       
Unemployment  1.02 (113 )  (0)  1.08 (35 )  0.95 (40 )  0.87 (38 ) 
Capacity utilization  0.96 (113 )  (0)  1.00 (35 )  0.93 (40 )  0.82 (38 ) 
GDP  1.04 (113 )  (0)  1.11 (35 )  0.97 (40 )  0.86 (38 ) 
Industrial production  1.03 (113 )  (0)  1.09 (35 )  0.97 (40 )  0.88 (38 ) 
Employment  1.02 (113 )  (0)  1.15 (35 )  1.02 (40 )  0.78 (38 ) 
CFNAI  0.94 (113 )  (0)  1.04 (35 )  0.93 (40 )  0.69 (38 ) 
Median 4-quarter difference  1.00 (113 )  (0)  1.06 (35 )  0.97 (40 )  0.85 (38 ) 
Overall median – all activity  1.04 (113 )  (0)  1.09 (35 )  1.01 (40 )  0.96 (38 ) 
 
Notes:   Numbers of observations used in the computation are given in parentheses.  The 
inflation expectations are SPF 1 year CPI and GDP price index, SPF 10-year CPI, and 
University of Michigan 1- and 5-10 year inflation surveys.   43
 
Table 4.  Relative root mean squared error of money-based pseudo out-of-sample 
forecasts of 4-quarter core PCE inflation, relative to UC-SV model.   
 
Series  1970Q1 –  
2010.Q1 
1970Q1 –  
1979.Q4 






       
Forecasts of inflation over next 4 quarters           
UCSV (RMSE)  0.97 (158 )  1.61 (40 )  0.86 (40 )  0.45 (40 )  0.39 (38 ) 
Monetary base (growth rate)  1.10 (155 )  1.04 (37 )  1.16 (40 )  1.12 (40 )  1.61 (38 ) 
Monetary base (change in growth rate)  1.12 (154 )  1.01 (36 )  1.10 (40 )  1.18 (40 )  2.33 (38 ) 
M2 (growth rate)  1.09 (155 )  1.07 (37 )  1.15 (40 )  1.08 (40 )  1.16 (38 ) 
M2 (change in growth rate)  1.06 (154 )  1.02 (36 )  1.15 (40 )  1.17 (40 )  1.21 (38 ) 
M3 (growth rate)  1.08 (141 )  1.07 (37 )  1.16 (40 )  0.93 (40 )  1.16 (24 ) 
M3 (change in growth rate)  1.04 (140 )  1.02 (36 )  1.11 (40 )  1.05 (40 )  1.05 (24 ) 
MZM (growth rate)  1.06 (155 )  1.05 (37 )  1.12 (40 )  1.04 (40 )  0.97 (38 ) 
MZM (change in growth rate)  1.20 (154 )  0.99 (36 )  1.77 (40 )  1.08 (40 )  1.11 (38 ) 
Median – 4 quarter ahead  1.05 (155 )  1.03 (37 )  1.10 (40 )  1.05 (40 )  1.04 (38 ) 
Forecasts of inflation over next 8 quarters           
UCSV (RMSE)  1.21 (154 )  1.98 (40 )  1.13 (40 )  0.55 (40 )  0.35 (34 ) 
Monetary base (growth rate)  1.05 (147 )  0.96 (33 )  1.24 (40 )  1.17 (40 )  1.01 (34 ) 
Monetary base (change in growth rate)  1.05 (146 )  0.98 (32 )  1.19 (40 )  1.17 (40 )  1.07 (34 ) 
M2 (growth rate)  1.08 (147 )  0.97 (33 )  1.33 (40 )  1.00 (40 )  1.31 (34 ) 
M2 (change in growth rate)  1.05 (146 )  0.98 (32 )  1.21 (40 )  1.12 (40 )  1.02 (34 ) 
M3 (growth rate)  1.04 (137 )  0.95 (33 )  1.29 (40 )  0.83 (40 )  1.50 (24 ) 
M3 (change in growth rate)  1.04 (136 )  0.97 (32 )  1.19 (40 )  1.09 (40 )  0.99 (24 ) 
MZM (growth rate)  1.27 (147 )  0.97 (33 )  1.92 (40 )  1.08 (40 )  0.91 (34 ) 
MZM (change in growth rate)  1.21 (146 )  0.97 (32 )  1.77 (40 )  1.09 (40 )  0.99 (34 ) 
Median – 8 quarter ahead  1.03 (147 )  0.96 (33 )  1.23 (40 )  1.06 (40 )  1.00 (34 ) 
 
Notes:   The first line in each block reports the standard deviation of the UC-SV forecast 
errors over the column sample period; the remaining lines report the ratio of the row 
forecast RMSE to the US-SV RMSE over the column sample.  Numbers of observations 
used in the computation are given in parentheses.  MZM denotes St. Louis Fed zero-
maturity money.   44
Table 5.  Predicted change in PCE inflation resulting from a 1 percentage point 
increase in PCE-Energy inflation, q quarters earlier. 
 
Entries in the first block are cumulative dynamic multipliers estimated over the indicated 












   + errort 
 
A.  Pass-through to headline PCE 
 
Q  Cumulative dynamic multiplier after q quarters 
  1962Q1 – 1982Q4  1983Q1 – 1994Q4  1995Q1 – 2006Q4 
0  0.075 (.008)  0.058 (.009) 0.048  (.003) 
1  0.081 (.020)  0.057 (.014) 0.052  (.007) 
2  0.144 (.025)  0.053 (.020) 0.052  (.011) 
3  0.169 (.035)  0.064 (.022) 0.053  (.014) 
4  0.189 (.039)  0.074 (.025) 0.056  (.015) 
5  0.179 (.041)  0.083 (.030) 0.063  (.017) 
6  0.213 (.042)  0.096 (.034) 0.065  (.019) 
7  0.234 (.041)  0.110 (.034) 0.065  (.020) 
8  0.199 (.045)  0.116 (.036) 0.059  (.022) 
      
Oil share in PCE (final 
year of subsample) 
8.7% 5.2% 5.8% 
 
 
B.  Pass-through to core PCE 
 
q  Cumulative dynamic multiplier after q quarters 
  1962Q1 – 1982Q4  1983Q1 – 1994Q4  1995Q1 – 2006Q4 
0 0.020  (.006)  -0.009  (.010) 0.000  (.004) 
1 0.034  (.017)  -0.007  (.018) 0.004  (.007) 
2 0.100  (.030)  -0.014  (.025) 0.003  (.011) 
3 0.132  (.035)  -0.007  (.028) 0.000  (.014) 
4  0.153 (.042)  0.009 (.032) 0.002  (.016) 
5  0.155 (.044)  0.015 (.036) 0.007  (.017) 
6  0.176 (.043)  0.028 (.040) 0.010  (.020) 
7  0.199 (.045)  0.040 (.041) 0.007  (.022) 
8  0.185 (.042)  0.045 (.046) 0.000  (.025) 
 




Figure 1.  Unemployment rate (solid line) and 4-quarter rate of core PCE inflation (solid with 
circles) during the eight U.S. recessions since 1960 (the 1980 and 1981 recessions are merged).  The 







Figure 2.  Unemployment rate (upper lines) and 4-quarter rate of core PCE inflation (lower lines) over six 
U.S. recessions from 1960 to 2010, including the mean and  1 standard error bands.  The series are plotted as 
deviations from their values at the NBER peak, scaled so that the unemployment rate reaches a maximum of 1 
at date 1.  Color coding is the same as in Figure 2; 1973 is omitted, and the 1980 and 1981 recessions are 
merged. 




                               (a) core CPI 
 
 
                              (b) GDP price index 
 
 
                             (c) PCE-all 
 
 
                                    (d) CPI-all 
 
Figure 3.  Unemployment rate (upper lines) and 4-quarter rates of inflation (lower lines) over six U.S. 
recessions from 1960 to 2010, including the mean and  1 standard error bands, for four price indexes.  
Construction and color coding is the same as in Figure 2.   48
 
(a) standard deviation of the change in trend (,t) 
 
 
(b) standard deviation of transitory component (,t) 
 
 
(c) Moving average coefficient (t) 
 
 
Figure 4.  UCSV model of core PCE inflation: estimated time-varying standard deviations of the trend and 
transitory components (panels (a) and (b)) and the implied time-varying coefficient of the moving average 
coefficient.   49
 
 
Figure 5.  The estimated trend in core PCE (t|t) and the 5-year ahead median inflation forecast from the 




(a) Civilian unemployment rate 
 
 
(b)  Derived unemployment activity measures 
 
Figure 6.  The unemployment rate (panel (a)) and three activity measures based on the unemployment rate 
(panel (b)): the one-sided bandpass gap, the 4-quarter difference, and the 12-quarter unemployment recession 
gap.   51
 




(b) unemployment gap:  12-quarter unemployment recession gap 
 
Figure 7.  Scatterplot of UCSV 4-quarter ahead forecast error (
4
4 t    – t|t) vs. real-time (one-sided) 
unemployment gaps, for two measures of the gap:  (a) 1-sided bandpass filtered, and (b) 12-quarter recession 
gap.  Kernel nonparametric regression functions and one standard error bands (dashed) are shown in blue.  
Parametric regression functions are in red:  in panel (a), a Barnes-Olivei (2003)-type piecewise linear 





Figure 8.  Nonparametric regression (blue solid) and 95% confidence bands (blue dashed) of the slope 
coefficient 4 as a function of the value of trend inflation at date t (t|t), using the unemployment recession gap.  
Red solid line is the parametric estimate (-0.18, SE = 0.06).  Parametric and nonparametric regressions are 




Figure 9.  Pseudo out-of-sample forecasts of 4-quarter core PCE inflation using various unemployment gaps:  
rolling root mean squared errors (top panel), rolling RMSEs relative to the UCSV model (middle panel), and 
forecasts (bottom panel).  Forecasts are 1-sided bandpass gap, nonlinear 1-sided bandpass gap, 4-quarter 
change in unemployment, and recession gap.  In the first panel, actual values of 
4
4 t    - t|t are in black.   54
 
 
Figure 10.  Dynamic simulations of 4-quarter core PCE inflation in five downturns, computed using the 
unemployment recession gap model.  All series are plotted as percentage point deviations from their values at 




Figure 11.  Pseudo out-of-sample forecasts of 4-quarter core PCE inflation using six activity measures 
(unemployment rate, capacity utilization, GDP, industrial production, employment, and the CFNAI).  Panels 
are rolling root mean squared errors (top), rolling RMSEs relative to the UCSV model (middle), and recursive 
forecasts (bottom).  Forecasts are median recession gap, median 1-sided bandpass gap, median 4-quarter 
difference, and the unemployment recession gap, where the median forecasts are across the six activity 





Figure 12.  Pseudo out-of-sample forecasts of 4-quarter core PCE inflation using the unemployment recession 
gap augmented with various survey measures of inflation expectations.  Panels are rolling root mean squared 
errors (top), rolling RMSEs relative to the UCSV model (middle), and recursive forecasts (bottom).  Forecasts 
are the unemployment recession gap, not augmented, and augmented with:  the SPF 10-year core CPI 
forecast, the SPF 1-your GDP price index forecast, and the median forecast using the five expectations 




Figure 13.  Pseudo out-of-sample forecasting of 4-quarter core PCE inflation using monetary variables.   
Forecasts are the unemployment recession gap (alone), and the forecast using the growth rate of M3 (alone), 
and the median forecast based on the eight measures of money in Table 4.  Panels are rolling root mean 







Figure 14.  Dynamic simulation of 4-quarter core PCE inflation from 2007Q4 to 2011Q3 computed using the 
unemployment recession gap model.  Unemployment values from 2010Q3 through 2011Q3 are SPF median 
forecasts.  All series are plotted as percentage point deviations from their values at the NBER peak.  Dashes 
are mean predicted values, dots are 90% confidence bands.   59
Appendix A 
 
     
Annual percentage price change of disaggregate (% at annual rate) 
 
 
Figure A-1. Empirical cumulative distributions of annual percentage price changes of 233 
components of PCE inflation, at five years between 1990 and 2007.  The vertical lines are 
monthly PCE (all) inflation rates for that month, for the date corresponding to the 
cumulative distributions.  Discontinuities at zero indicate a “pile-up” of zero price 
changes.  The infrequency of pile-ups at zero and the smooth shifting of the cdf through 
zero are consistent with the micro (individual-good) evidence in Nakamura and Steinsson 
(2008) and Klenow and Kryvtsov (2008) that price declines are commonplace.  Data 
source: BEA Personal Income Web site.   